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THE RIGHT TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FORMALISM, 
REALISM, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN LAWRENCE (2003), 
WINDSOR (2013), & OBERGEFELL (2015) 
RONALD KAHN∗ 
My work to date has centered on the process through which individual 
rights have developed under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Thus far, I have explored the question of 
why a “conservative-moderate” Supreme Court in a conservative political 
age (since the 1990s) has expanded implied fundamental rights to sexual 
intimacy for homosexuals and sustained the fundamental right of women to 
choose whether to have an abortion.1  Since 1969, when President Nixon 
named Warren Burger as Chief Justice, through 2005, when President 
George W. Bush appointed Chief Justice John Roberts and nominated Jus-
tice Samuel Alito for the Supreme Court, Republican presidents have made 
twelve of fourteen appointments to the Supreme Court, thus constituting a 
clear majority of appointees in any given year.2 
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 1.  See Ronald Kahn, Social Constructions, Supreme Court Reversals, and American Politi-
cal Development: Lochner, Plessy, Bowers, but Not Roe, in THE SUPREME COURT AND 
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 67, 67–116 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter Kahn, Social Constructions]; see also Ronald Kahn, Why Does a Moder-
ate/Conservative Supreme Court in a Conservative Age Expand Gay Rights?: Lawrence v. Texas 
(2003) in Legal and Political Time, in 44 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY, SPECIAL 
ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN A CONSERVATIVE ERA 173, 173–217 (Austin Sarat ed., 
2008) [hereinafter Kahn, Why Does a Moderate/Conservative Supreme Court in a Conservative 
Age Expand Gay Rights?]. 
 2.  President Nixon appointed Chief Justice Burger in 1969, Justice Blackmun in 1970, Jus-
tice Powell and Justice Rehnquist in 1972.  President Ford appointed Justice Stevens in 1975.  
Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Aug. 7, 2015).  Democratic 
President Carter had no appointees to the Supreme Court.  President Reagan appointed Justice 
O’Connor in 1981, reappointed Justice Rehnquist as Chief Justice in 1986 and appointed Justice 
Scalia in 1986 and Justice Kennedy in 1988.  President George Herbert Walker Bush appointed 
Justices Souter in 1990 and Thomas in 1991.  Democratic President Bill Clinton appointed Justic-
es Ginsburg in 1993 and Breyer in 1994.  Id.  Not until 2005, eleven years later, would any Presi-
dent make additional appointments to the Supreme Court.  In 2005, Republican President George 
W. Bush appointed John Roberts as Chief Justice.  One year later, Bush appointed Justice Alito.  
For a list of all Supreme Court nominations from 1789 to the present, including those listed above, 
see U.S. Senate, Supreme Court Nominations 1789–Present, UNITED STATES SENATE, 
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Yet during the Rehnquist Court, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
right to abortion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey3 and, in Lawrence v. Texas,4 overturned Bowers v. Hardwick,5 ex-
tending the implied fundamental rights of privacy and personhood to homo-
sexuals regarding the right of sexual intimacy.6  Additionally, in Romer v. 
Evans,7 a 6-3 decision, the Rehnquist Court invalidated a Colorado consti-
tutional amendment that required all laws relating to homosexuals to be val-
id only through the process of amending Colorado’s constitution.8  The 
Court said this initiative was invalid because it was based on pure animus 
against homosexuals and, thus, was a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.9 
Most significantly, in United States v. Windsor10 the Roberts Court re-
fused to backtrack on the expansion of homosexuals’ rights under the Due 
Process Clause in Lawrence11 and under the Equal Protection Clause in 
                                                          
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 
2015). 
 3.  505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).  To ascertain whether or not Casey upheld Roe technically or 
was in fact rights expansive, one must do more than an analysis in policy terms of whether the 
Pennsylvania abortion law has made it more difficult or easier in the short run to obtain an abor-
tion; one would have to explore whether the right itself is more or less fundamental by reviewing 
the evolution of Supreme Court decisions addressing this issue.  In this regard, I argue that the 
Casey decision upheld the fundamental right to choose an abortion, and in important ways made 
the right more fundamental.  The jettisoning of the trimester framework in Casey was a significant 
step in expanding the right of abortion choice because it did away with medical science as the 
framework within which the right to choose abortion rested.  Arguably, Casey removed the colli-
sion course that would undermine the right to choose, as medical science now allows fetuses to be 
kept alive closer to conception, albeit with scientific aids, and women likewise have safer abor-
tions closer to term. 
In Gonzales v. Carhart, the most recent Supreme Court case addressing “partial birth abor-
tions,” the Supreme Court reinforced the fundamentality of the right to choose, but also recog-
nized that certain abortion methods carry greater risks.  550 U.S. 124, 156–57 (2007).  Justice 
Kennedy openly recognized the practice of lethal injections for fetuses.  Id. at 136.  Moreover, as 
both Roe and Casey seem to suggest, there remains the possibility that a state could pass a law 
today that would permit women to choose an abortion up to term, as long as the law takes into 
consideration those standards of humanity espoused in Gonzales. 
 4.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 5.  478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 6.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law 
of the State, that declaration . . . is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination 
both in the public and in the private spheres.  The central holding of Bowers . . . demeans the lives 
of homosexual persons.”). 
 7.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 8.  Id. at 623, 627. 
 9.  Id. at 632, 635. 
 10.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 11.  Id. at 2694. 
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Romer,12 instead choosing to expand homosexuals’ rights under the Consti-
tution13 by declaring the nation’s Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) un-
constitutional, as it violated basic due process and equal protection princi-
ples.14 
Thus, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed and expanded implied funda-
mental rights and equal protection under the law for gay men and lesbians 
during a period of political dominance by social conservatives, evangelical 
Christians, and other groups who view the protection of their definition of 
family values as a central mission of government.  I have argued that the 
Supreme Court surprisingly—or, more accurately, unsurprisingly—has ei-
ther sustained doctrine in opposition to the core values of the Republican 
Party or expanded individual rights in these doctrinal areas.15 
In order to explain first why a “conservative-moderate”16 Supreme 
Court has expanded implied fundamental rights for homosexuals; second, to 
make sense of the extraordinary decisions by lower federal courts and state 
courts overturning state bans on same-sex marriage even though not specif-
ically required by Windsor to do so; and finally, to understand the most re-
cent Supreme Court case relating to same-sex marriage, Obergefell v. 
Hodges,17 we must focus on the relationship between formalism and realism 
in Court decisionmaking, as well as how Court decisionmaking relates the 
social, economic, and political factors outside of the Court to principles 
such as due process and equal protection that operate within the Court’s in-
ternal discourse.  Such an analysis will explain why most social scientists 
                                                          
 12.  Id. at 2692. 
 13.  Cf. id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority emphasizes that DOMA was a 
‘systemwide enactment with no identified connection to any particular area of federal law,’ but a 
State’s definition of marriage ‘is the foundation of the State’s broader authority to regulate the 
subject of domestic relations with respect to the [p]rotection of offspring, property interests, and 
the enforcement of marital responsibilities.’’’  “And the federal decision undermined (in the ma-
jority’s view) the ‘dignity [already] conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign pow-
er,’ whereas a State’s decision whether to expand the definition of marriage from its traditional 
contours involves no similar concern.” (internal citations omitted) (quoting id. at 2697, 2693–94 
(majority opinion))). 
 14.  Id. at 2693 (majority opinion) (holding that “impos[ing] a disadvantage, a separate status, 
and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned au-
thority of the States” violates due process and equal protection principles). 
 15.  See Kahn, Why Does a Moderate/Conservative Supreme Court in a Conservative Age 
Expand Gay Rights?, supra note 1, at 173–74. 
 16.  Citizens and many scholars have viewed the Rehnquist and Roberts Court eras as moder-
ate or conservative, in comparison to the Warren Court era that is usually viewed as liberal.  I seek 
to refute the analytic usefulness of this moniker or like monikers because such bottom-line de-
scriptions of Court eras belie the fact that the bidirectionality between formalism and realism in 
Court decisionmaking leads the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts at times to be progressive and the 
Warren Court to be conservative or moderate because of the nature of the legal process. 
 17.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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and many legal experts in constitutional law have failed to predict or ac-
count for the expansion of privacy rights and other individual liberties.18 
In Part I, I present two primary models through which scholars seek to 
explain Court decisions.  These models differ based on whether or not 
scholars accept that there is a divide between formalism and realism in ex-
plaining Court decisionmaking.  That is, the models differ based on whether 
scholars accept what Brian Z. Tamanaha calls the “formalist-realist di-
vide.”19  Scholars who rely on Model 1 accept this divide, seeking to ex-
plain Court decisionmaking in unidirectional terms, either internally—from 
text or precedent—or externally—that is, directly from the social, econom-
ic, and political realities of the world outside, or directly from other factors, 
such as the attitudes toward public policy of justices before they reach the 
Court or the Court’s response to historical events.20 
Model 2 explanations of Court decisionmaking and doctrinal change 
reject this divide between formalism and realism, emphasizing that there is 
                                                          
 18.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuali-
ty and Marriage 2 (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 196, 2003) (“My principal 
suggestion here is that the Court’s remarkable decision in Lawrence v. Texas is best seen as a suc-
cessor to Griswold v. Connecticut: judicial invalidation of a law that had become hopelessly out of 
touch with existing social convictions.  So understood, Lawrence, like Griswold, reflects an Amer-
ican variation of the old English idea of desuetude.” (footnotes omitted) (citing Lawrence v. Tex-
as, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965))). 
 19.  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING 1–3 (2010) (noting that the formalist-realist divide has permeated legal cir-
cles and political science and has also shaped general historical understandings). 
 20.  See JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION (2015), who seek to explain and justify Court decisionmaking in terms of the im-
portance of the originalist text, while under certain conditions support precedents which are based 
on non-originalist principles, such as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  See also 
MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (2000) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education  can be explained by the nation’s 
need to be on higher moral ground in its Cold War with communism); CHARLES R. EPP, THE 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court establishes new individual rights primarily 
due to efforts by legal advocacy groups to secure them); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW 
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that Court reacts the 
politics outside the Court when making landmark decisions and can’t sustain such decisions if po-
litical elites and the public oppose them); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (arguing that Court decisionmaking can 
be explained by Justices’ views on policy and political philosophies before they joined the Court); 
Howard Gillman, Jurisprudential Regimes and Unenumerated Rights, 9 J. CONST. L. 1, 107–19 
(2006) (arguing that Court decisionmaking and changes in individual rights can be explained as 
response to the policy wants of the majority coalition in power); Mark A. Graber, The Non-
Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 35, 
35–74 (1993) (same).  All of these approaches seek explanations of Court action based on factors 
outside of the Court and refuse to see the importance of law, precedent, and the legal process in 
the Court as explanatory of Court action and explore how the realist elements that each emphasiz-
es is related to formalist principles. 
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a bidirectional relationship between the formalism of doctrinal analysis and 
the realism of the world outside the Court—that is, that the Court applies 
legal principles and precedents in light of the social, economic, and political 
climate outside its walls.21  I argue that Supreme Court decisionmaking 
must be understood as bidirectional, and I use the Court’s jurisprudence 
with regard to gay rights as my lens. 
Part II analyzes United States v. Windsor as an example of the Su-
preme Court engaging in a bidirectional decisionmaking process.  I first 
look at what polity and rights principles are raised in the case, and how they 
are applied through what I call a social construction process, which has 
been an important part of Court decisionmaking since its establishment.  I 
ask whether both liberal and conservative justices employ arguments that 
are based on a bidirectionality between principles and the lived lives of in-
dividuals.  I also ask whether the polity and rights principles articulated and 
applied in Windsor make sense in light of the principles and social con-
structions in prior cases involving the rights of privacy and personhood, and 
then consider the impact of this finding on the conditions under which indi-
vidual rights are expanded or disestablished. 
In Part III, I argue against the forcefulness and staying power of argu-
ments against same-sex marriage used by justices in the minority in Wind-
sor, in part because of the distance between the principles they advocate 
and the lived lives of persons.  I explore this distance in light of how polity 
and rights principles have been defined in past cases, the social construc-
tions used in support of such principles, and the conditions under which the 
Court has chosen to overturn landmark rights decisions in the past. 
In Part IV, I conclude by demonstrating that Obergefell v. Hodges, the 
case in which the Supreme Court established a right to same-sex marriage 
under the Constitution and outlawed states from banning such marriages, 
was a natural outcome of my analysis in Parts I-III, which were completed 
well before Obergefell was decided. 
                                                          
 21.  See, e.g., Ronald Kahn, Originalism, the Living Constitution, and Supreme Court Deci-
sion Making in the Twenty-First Century: Explaining Lawrence v. Texas, 67 MD. L. REV. 25, 35 
(2007) (noting that “bi-directionality between the internal Court and the world outside occurs at 
several levels, at the level of the lived lives of citizens as the Court makes decisions about rights 
of privacy and personhood as we see in the [social construction process], and at the level of poli-
tics itself”).  This Paper will center on the use of both models to explain doctrinal change on the 
Supreme Court.  Nevertheless, these models may also be applied to decisionmaking and doctrinal 
change in lesser federal and state courts. 
These two models are distinguishable in other respects as well.  For example, political scien-
tists applying Model 1 use quantitative methods and those applying Model 2 use interpretive 
methods to study the Supreme Court and doctrinal change.  Further, both models adopt conflicting 
assumptions about the importance of Court institutional norms and process on the preference for-
mation of Justices. 
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I.  UNIDIRECTIONAL AND BIDIRECTIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF COURT 
DECISIONMAKING 
A.  The Formalist-Realist Divide and “Balanced Realism” 
To understand why Model 1 dominates the analysis of Supreme Court 
decisionmaking, especially among most social scientists, and why Model 2 
is superior in explaining Court action and doctrinal change, we need to ex-
plore the nature of this divide: specifically, whether the divide between 
formalism and realism was ever valid historically as justices made deci-
sions, and whether it remained valid when Windsor was decided.22 
The divide narrative maintains that the 1870s through the l920s should 
be viewed as the heyday of legal formalism, asserting that “the law is an in-
ternally consistent and logical body of rules that is independent from the 
variable forms of its surrounding social institutions.”23  The formalist vi-
sion, as described by legal realists, includes the following premises: “(1) the 
law is rationally determinate, and (2) judging is [deductive in a] mechanical 
[way] . . . (3) legal reasoning is autonomous, since the class of legal reasons 
suffices to justify a unique outcome [and] no . . . non-legal reasons [are] 
demanded or required;”24 (4) the process is formal, in the sense “that right 
answers [can] be derived from [an] autonomous, logical working out of the 
system”; and (5) legal thought is “conceptually ordered in that ground-level 
rules [can] all be derived from a few fundamental principles.”25 
The other side of the divide narrative places an emphasis on legal real-
ist conceptions of judging and the study of courts, which are viewed as 
counter to conceptions of judicial formalism.26  During the 1920s and 
1930s, legal realists were charged with discrediting legal formalism; this is 
due in part to the insights of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, 
and Justice Benjamin Cardozo.27 
                                                          
 22.  Brian Tamanaha, at least, suggests that the divide is a “stranglehold.  It consists of a web 
of interlocking misinterpretations and confusions bundled in a mutually reinforcing package that 
is now virtually taken for granted.  The consequences of this collection of errors are ongoing and 
pernicious.”  TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 3. 
 23.  TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 2 (quoting MATHIEU DEFLEM, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: 
VISIONS OF A SCHOLARLY TRADITION 98 (2008)). 
 24.  Id. at 160 (quoting Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1138, 1145–46 (1999)). 
 25.  Id. (quoting Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608–09 
(1999)). 
 26.  Id. at 1. 
 27.  Id. (“[T]he legal realists discredited legal formalism, demonstrating that the law is filled 
with gaps and contradictions, that the law is indeterminate. . . .  The realists argued that judges 
decide according to their personal preferences and then construct the legal analysis to justify the 
desired outcome.”). 
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For the realists, legal formalism, principles, and precedents—that is, 
the law and legal method—do not explain what justices and judges do.  For 
the realist narrative one must look outside the law and legal process, into 
the ideologies of justices and the social, economic, and political world out-
side the Court, to explain what courts do.  The law and legal process is in-
determinate, not bound in a disciplined way, and clearly cannot be ex-
plained by the Court applying principles and precedents. 
In reality, however, the Court engaged—and engages—in what Ta-
manaha calls “balanced realism” in its decisionmaking, which rejects simp-
ly formalist or realist bases for Court decisions.28  The key components in-
clude: 1) the acceptance of the “openness of law and the limitations of 
human judges,” 2) the realization that the U.S. legal culture has been “con-
summately realistic about these matters,” and 3) the proposition that legal 
rules should be followed by judges.29  Tamanaha chooses the term “bal-
anced realism” because of the negative connotations of the term “balanced 
formalism.”30  Factors in this decisionmaking process include judges (1) 
engaging in the process of cognitive framing, (2) looking at purposes be-
hind legislation and common law rules as they apply them,31 (3) resolving 
differences among interpretations of a statute or the Constitution, and (4) 
resolving conﬂicts, gaps, and ambiguities in the law.32  In doing so, judges 
accept that there are formalist elements that impact and influence Court de-
cisionmaking as well. 
The history of Supreme Court decisionmaking demonstrates that unidi-
rectional, formalist models explaining the Court’s decisionmaking simply 
do not fit with what the Court does in practice.  Judges in the so-called for-
malist age knew that law was indeterminate at times, involved notions of 
policy considerations, and that principles had to be reconciled with cus-
                                                          
 28.  See id. at 193–94 for a discussion of how “balanced realism” requires the Court to bring 
the realist social, political, and economic world into its decisionmaking. 
 29.  See id. at 179. 
 30.  Id. at 179–80 (explaining that “[a] balanced realism accepts (indeed embraces) that social 
factors and considerations play into judicial decisionmaking in various ways”). 
 31.  Tamanaha and other scholars of the Court view the impact of common law principles and 
ways of deciding cases as a major reason why the formalist-realist divide must be rejected.  See 
generally, e.g., DOUGLAS E. EDLIN, JUDGES AND UNJUST LAWS: COMMON LAW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (2008) (discussing how 
common law tradition gives judges the dual mandate of applying law and developing law); JAMES 
R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2003) 
(arguing that common law is key to unlocking fundamental principles of the U.S. Constitution and 
is a guide for judges deciding contemporary constitutional matters).  Also, see DAVID A. 
STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (University of Chicago Press, 2012) and David A. Strauss, 
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1996), for a theory of consti-
tutional interpretation which accepts the bidirectional relationship between formalism and realism. 
 32.  See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 193. 
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toms, norms, opinions in the community, and a sense of rights and social 
interests in a changing world. 
The components of Tamanaha’s “balanced realism” mirror the major 
components of what I have called Model 2 bidirectional Supreme Court de-
cisionmaking.  In such a decisionmaking process, both formalist (legal 
rights principles and process norms) and realist (involving the political, so-
cial, and economic world) elements are included.  Tamanaha demonstrates 
that the scholars who were identified as on either side of the formalist-
realist divide actually rejected the divide when they analyzed Supreme 
Court decisionmaking as a process or the cases that are the product of that 
decisionmaking.33  Thus, the divide narrative is a myth when we explore the 
nature of judging since the birth of the nation.  A rigorous analysis of the 
expressed thoughts of justices and other jurists shows that, throughout the 
history of U.S. law, the vision of “judge as formalist” was never descriptive 
of adjudication.34 Furthermore, contemporary efforts to construct a viable 
new formalism, including the new originalist approaches to interpreting the 
Constitution, have absorbed the major insights of balanced realism, leaving 
nothing distinctive to the claim of being formalistic.35 
However, the myth of “[f]ormalism possesses a great potential for con-
fusion with no compensating, redeeming theoretical value.”36  The most 
demanding constructions of formalism impose conditions that are impossi-
ble for judges to meet and poorly articulate basic practices found in com-
mon law and constitutional judging.  Tamanaha argues that there was a 
strong overlap between the views of nineteenth- and twentieth-century his-
torical jurists and legal realists on their views of judging and the relation-
ship of law and society.37  We see an absence of the divide by the fact that 
jurists, well before the rise of the realists, accepted core insights that would 
later be labeled as realist approaches to judging.  As Tamanaha writes, 
“[v]irtually every one of the core insights about judging now associated 
with the realists was prominently stated decades before, often by historical 
jurists.”38  For example, “[h]istorical jurists believed that judges brought 
society’s values and sense of justice into law, subconsciously (via the inter-
                                                          
 33.  Id. at 159–80. 
 34.  Id. at 89–90. 
 35.  See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (discussing “new originalism”); 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
(2004). 
 36.  TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 162. 
 37.  Id. at 89. 
 38.  Id. at 79. 
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nalization of social values by judges) as well as consciously (by deliberately 
seeking to derive or produce or match society’s sense of right).”39 
B.  Implications of the Supreme Court Engaging in “Balanced 
Realism” 
At the core of the Supreme Court’s “balanced realism” is a process of 
construction, one that employs principles and precedents and their applica-
tion to actions of persons and institutions in social, economic, and political 
worlds outside the Court.  Tamanaha asserts that “a balanced realism holds 
that many corners of the law are always in the making through judicial con-
struction, in ways large and small, which does not defeat the broader enter-
prise of rule-bound judicial decision making.”40 
Tamanaha also emphasizes the special qualities of legal institutions 
and their decisionmaking processes, noting that, “[j]udges also uniformly 
hasten to emphasize, however, that, notwithstanding the openness of law 
and the limitations of judges, their decisions are substantially determined by 
the law.”41  In Tamanaha’s description of “balanced realism,” which de-
scribes the basic elements of Supreme Court and lesser federal and state 
court decisionmaking from the eighteenth century to today, one can see the 
importance of institutional norms, including what it means for the justice to 
be professional: 
Judges are unique individuals with bents, biases, and various 
strengths and limitations, as well as differences in moral and po-
litical views, and differing views of judging . . . [that] combine to 
create a zone of uncertainty and variation in judicial decision-
making.  It has always been so. Nonetheless, legal rules frequent-
ly work and judges frequently render rule-bound decisions.42 
Accepting the bidirectionality between formalism/law and realism, and 
between the Court and the world outside, suggests a more filigreed ap-
proach to the question of whether the Supreme Court is autonomous of so-
ciety.43  The preceding social factors come into play in the law within a 
                                                          
 39.  Id. at 87. 
 40.  Id. at 195. 
 41.  Id. at 184–85 (noting that even Judge Posner admits that judges should “stick pretty close 
to statutory text and judicial precedent in most cases . . . to enhance their self-esteem and to earn 
the accolades and respect of their judicial colleagues and legal audiences” (quoting RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 209 (1999))). 
 42.  Id. at 187. 
 43.  Id. at 193–94 (noting that “[l]aw has its own internal language, concepts, practices, and 
imperatives that shape its operation and development, but the legislators, judges, and jurists who 
produce the law in the United States do so in connection with social values, social problems, so-
cial situations, social concerns, and social interests”). 
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context suffused with and structured by legal factors that lend it a rule-
based quality.44  Multiple legal layers, the group nature of judging, the sta-
ble hierarchy of the legal system, and the presence of a legally trained audi-
ence of participants and observers, as Tamanaha explains: 
[S]tabilize[] legal interpretation sufficiently for judges to see law 
and decide cases in much the same way most of the time regard-
less of differences in personal backgrounds, values, and prefer-
ences.  This is what the legal realists meant when they insisted 
that legal rules in isolation do not decide cases.45 
C.  Model 1: Unidirectional Models for Explaining and Justifying 
Court Action 
The legalist strand of Model 1 unidirectional explanations and justifi-
cations of Court decisionmaking assumes that judging can be explained 
through the study of judges applying principles and precedents in a formal-
istic way, without looking into the outside world of the lived lives of per-
sons.  Under this strand of Model 1, it is assumed that doctrinal change 
comes from a completely internal process of justices applying precedents 
and principles.  The objective for legalist scholars is to influence this pro-
cess, or train lawyers to do so through the reading of their scholarship.  The 
most famous and influential theory of constitutional interpretation that is 
characteristic of this internal-looking, unidirectional strand of Model 1 is 
originalism.  However, while advocates of originalism view their theory of 
how to interpret the Constitution as formalist, and not political or realist, 
there are many reasons to believe that there are realist elements in the 
originalist interpretation of the Constitution.46 
Constitutional scholars, conservative and liberal alike, who argue for 
their version of what the constitutional text does or should mean are unidi-
rectional in their goals, whether or not such unidirectionality is possible or 
not.47  Thus, constitutional theories that argue that the Constitution should 
be interpreted based on a particular theory of rights or polity principles are 
also unidirectional, even when that theory makes the argument that the Su-
preme Court is only one of many important venues for making constitution-
al choices, and perhaps not the best one at that.48  The reason for this is that, 
                                                          
 44.  Id. at 194 (citing LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 53–57 (2006)). 
 45.  Id. at 195. 
 46.  See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (examining the Second 
Amendment’s right to bear arms as an example of social construction processes undertaken by 
originalist as well as non-originalist justices). 
 47.  BALKIN, supra note 35; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 7–8 (1997). 
 48.  See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (ad-
vocating for “taking the Constitution away from the courts”). 
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like originalism, theories that are justificatory, no matter on what basis, are 
formalist, while the Court is simultaneously formalist and realist in its deci-
sionmaking.  A theory that advocates a particular set of polity or rights 
principles on which the Court should decide cases can neither explain what 
the Court does nor be a model for how the Court should act.  Thus, unidi-
rectional approaches used by legalists would include the originalist ap-
proach, as well as constitutional theories that argue for one approach to 
what the Constitution means.49 
The formalist vision of law as rationally determinate, judging as de-
ductive in a mechanical way, and legal reasoning as autonomous from soci-
ety is not a valid description of decisionmaking by the Supreme Court.  
Right answers cannot be derived from an autonomous, logical working of 
the system.  Legal thought is not conceptually ordered to the point that 
ground-level rules could be derived from a few fundamental principles.  
Therefore, unidirectional Model 1 approaches for explaining Court actions, 
or for advocating normative bases for its actions, accept the divide between 
formalism and realism, and in so doing are not based on an understanding 
of what the Court has done throughout its history.  Tamanaha writes: 
 The story about formalism promotes the unrealistic image of 
self-applying legal rules; skeptical realism promotes the equally 
unrealistic opposite image of human judges pursuing their per-
sonal preferences beneath a veneer of legal rules. . . .  If legal 
rules were perfectly preexistent and judges were calculating ma-
chines, these situations [of difference in opinion among justices, 
negotiation, and changes of opinion] would be indications of 
flaws.  But mechanical jurisprudence is impossible.   It is a mis-
take, therefore to think of these unavoidable aspects as flaws ra-
ther than as inherent conditions of law and judging.50 
Social science explanations of Court decisionmaking, the second 
strand of unidirectional explanations and justifications of Court action, are 
also decidedly one-sided; however, here the unidirectionality is on the side 
of realism.  We see the acceptance of the divide by attitudinalists who em-
phasize that the Court decides cases based on the ideology and policy inter-
ests of the justices, or behavioral political scientists who emphasize that jus-
                                                          
 49.  See, e.g. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION 
OF LIBERTY 2–3 (2004); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: A MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (arguing that the Court should intercede into the political 
system to help individuals and groups secure equal rights when the political system cannot do so 
because of prejudice). 
 50.  TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 195. 
 282 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:271 
tices act strategically to get the best decision they can get in line with their 
ideologies.51 
An acceptance of the divide and the reliance on unidirectional explana-
tions for Court decisions is also seen in the scholarship of the leading mod-
ern-day neo-Dahlians, Howard Gillman and Mark Graber, who are now 
called “regime theorists.”52  There is a divide between formalist and realist 
explanations of Court action, even though these contemporary regime theo-
rists accept the theoretical underpinnings of bidirectional explanations 
found in the historical institutional/American political development ap-
proach to the study of law and courts.  Therefore, although the Court has 
engaged in bidirectional decisionmaking and rejected the formalist-realist 
divide, scholars choose to accept the divide in the study of the Court, and 
this acceptance is at the core of why political scientists, social scientists, 
and most historians are unable to explain the development of individual 
rights on the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. 
Analysis to date has found that there is a distinctiveness to Supreme 
Court decisionmaking in its institutional norms and practices and how it re-
lates to the social, political, and economic world outside.  For example, I 
argue elsewhere that the unique qualities of Supreme Court decisionmaking 
and the Court’s relationship to turning points in individual rights when 
compared to political institutions mean that the “legal time” of the Court is 
unlike what Stephen Skowronek has called the “political time” of the presi-
dency.  Notably, Skowronek has emphasized that there is an increase in the 
“waning of political time” with each new president—that is, the window 
during which a president can make substantial policy changes decreases.53  
Bidirectional Supreme Court decisionmaking, with its social construction 
process and comparison of principles and social constructions at issue in a 
case before the Court with those in precedents, has occurred throughout the 
life of our nation. In contrast to what presidents face—a waning of political 
time in which to secure change—there is no increase in the waning of legal 
time with each new Supreme Court era. 
                                                          
 51.  See id. at 115–21. 
 52.  See Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the No-
tion of a “Living Constitution” in the Course of American State-Building, ST. AM. POL. DEV. 191, 
191–247 (1997) (arguing that before 1937, the Court was originalist and can be understood as 
making formalist decisions, and after 1937, Court decisions can primarily be explained as realist 
in its decisionmaking); see also Graber, supra note 20, at 35 (arguing that because of complexities 
in the political system, the Court follows politics or makes decisions in favor of individual rights 
that political elites really want, but cannot publicly support). 
 53.  See Kahn, Why Does a Moderate/Conservative Supreme Court in a Conservative Age 
Expand Gay Rights?, supra note 1, at 202–04; STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, PRESIDENTIAL 
LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME: REPRISE AND REAPPRAISAL 76–78 (2d ed., 2011). 
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D.  Model 2: Bidirectional Models for Explaining Court Action: The 
Mutual Construction of Formalism and Realism 
Scholars who reject the formalist-realist divide employ Model 2 un-
derstandings of Supreme Court decisionmaking.  Under Model 2, doctrinal 
change, including the development of individual rights, is caused by a con-
stitutive Supreme Court decisionmaking process that is bidirectional: the 
internal decisionmaking process by which principles and precedents are ap-
plied in a case interacts with the social, economic, and political world out-
side the Court, but not in the unidirectional way that is assumed by both le-
galist scholars and social scientists.  Moreover, explanations of Court action 
must also be explained in bidirectional terms.  Unlike Model 1, Model 2 
scholars do not see the outside world as one “X factor” causing Court deci-
sions; they do not see internal values and norms as deciding cases in a 
closed system either.  Thus, bidirectionality occurs at two levels—at the 
level of the relationship between formalist and realist elements in internal 
Court decisionmaking, and at the level of this internal decisionmaking pro-
cess interacting with the realism of the social, economic, and political world 
outside the Court. 
Scholars who study Supreme Court decisionmaking and seek to ex-
plain doctrinal change over time make the following assumptions: 
1. Court decisionmaking rests on a bidirectional relationship between 
the formalist elements of cases, such as legal principles and precedents, and 
the social, economic, and political world outside the Court. 
2. This bidirectional decisionmaking on the part of the Supreme Court 
involves a mutual construction process between text, precedent, and princi-
ples and the social, political, and historical realities of the world outside the 
Court.  “Realities” that are important to the Court are the lived lives of per-
sons.  Decisionmaking does not simply result from the realities of the insti-
tutional world outside the Court as regime theorists have argued, or the im-
pact of historical events on Court decisionmaking as argued by historians.54 
3. Court decisionmaking is influenced by institutional processes and 
norms, and the education and socialization of justices as lawyers. Thus, 
preference formation occurs within the decisionmaking process. 
4. Justices are respectful of the importance of the wider historical, in-
stitutional, and political context in which institutions operate.  They concep-
tualize legal principles and processes, categories of analysis, and institu-
                                                          
 54.  See Gillman supra note 52 and accompanying text; Graber, supra note 20 and accompa-
nying text; see also MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 104 (2011) (arguing that the Court decided to end school segregation in 
Brown v. Board of Education because of concerns that having race segregation undermined our 
nation’s position during the Cold War). 
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tional norms as factors that structure Court decisionmaking over time—that 
is, in a historical context.55 
As a Model 2 scholar, I reject the premises of Model 1; I reject the as-
sumption of unidirectional causation for explaining Court decisionmaking, 
whether that is from the mechanical application of principles and prece-
dents, or from institutional and historical moments outside the Court.  I ac-
cept the importance of both the clash of polity and rights principles on the 
Court when it decides individual rights cases and the Court’s dialogue with 
the interpretive community.  Most importantly, I find that Supreme Court 
decisionmaking has a more direct, bidirectional relationship through its en-
gagement in a social construction of the lived lives of citizens as it applies 
polity and rights principles through an analogical process. 
II.  UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR: FORMALISM AND REALISM IN JUSTICE 
KENNEDY’S MAJORITY OPINION 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion compares polity and rights princi-
ples and social constructions in precedents—such as Romer and Law-
rence—with those polity and rights principles and social constructions that 
he himself defines in Windsor.56  The opinion also illustrates the definition 
of polity and rights principles in light of the reality of the lived lives of per-
sons.  There is a mutual construction of formalist principles and realism—a 
key indicator that Justice Kennedy rejects the formalist-realist divide.   In 
constructing the opinion, Justice Kennedy must continually go outside the 
walls of the Constitution to apply polity and rights principles in Windsor.  
The role of precedent is key to the decision, which asks whether the nation-
al government’s denial of recognition for state-defined marriages violates 
equal protection and due process liberty principles as established in Romer 
and Lawrence.  Through this analysis, we can better understand the re-
sponses by Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Alito to Justice 
Kennedy’s decision, and whether the Court will decide that it is unconstitu-
tional to ban same-sex marriages, as explored, respectively, in Parts III and 
IV of this Paper. 
                                                          
 55.  See MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF 
CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991) (providing particularly useful examples of this approach with re-
gard to the study of the Supreme Court and judicial review); Gillman, supra note 52, at 191–247; 
Karen Orren, Ideas and Institutions, 28 POLITY 97–101 (1995); Rogers M. Smith, Political Juris-
prudence, the “New Institutionalism,” and the Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89 
(1988). 
 56.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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A.  The Relationship of Polity and Rights Principles in Windsor 
Polity principles are central to this case for all of the justices.  Parts I 
and III of the Kennedy decision center on, respectively, the standing to sue 
and the key polity principle in the case: that throughout our nation’s history, 
it has been traditional for states to decide who can marry and most issues of 
family law.57  Justice Kennedy provides evidence of the traditional defer-
ence that the national government and the courts have given to states to de-
fine who can marry when he emphasizes the following: (1) “[t]he definition 
of marriage is the foundation of the States’s broader authority to regulate 
the subject of domestic relations with respect to . . . offspring, property in-
terest, and enforcement of marital responsibilities;”58 (2) “at the time of 
adoption of the Constitution, [states] possessed full power over . . . mar-
riage and divorce;”59 (3) the Constitution did not delegate authority over 
marriage and divorce to the federal government; and (4) federal courts defer 
to states on regulation of marriage and divorce even in diversity of citizen-
ship cases.60 
In Parts III and IV, Justice Kennedy considers the merits of the case.  
In doing so both polity and rights principles are explored, and it is the rela-
tionship between these elements that is at the core of the decision.  Most 
importantly, in discussing what eleven states and the District of Columbia 
had done in recognizing same-sex marriages, Justice Kennedy uses lan-
guage that is informed by substantive values that the Court has defined in 
prior gay rights cases.61  Here and throughout the case, polity principles of 
deference to states on defining marriage are considered in light of rights 
principles constructed in prior cases, including Lawrence.62 
Justice Kennedy begins with a general reference to substantive values 
at issue in state recognition of same-sex marriage.63  The polity principle of 
deference to states in deciding who can marry is more than just a starting 
point for deciding whether DOMA is valid under the Constitution because 
the rejection of this polity principle by the federal government informs sub-
                                                          
 57.  Id. at 2682–93. 
 58.  Id. at 2691 (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942)). 
 59.  Id. (quoting Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 575 (1906)). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 2692.  Justice Kennedy describes sexual intimacy as “but one element in a personal 
bond that is more enduring,” as he did in Lawrence, and then links up these rights to the right to 
marry.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 2694 (referencing Lawrence once again). 
 63. Id. at 2689 (“New York, in common with, as of this writing, [eleven] other States and the 
District of Columbia, decided that same-sex couples should have the right to marry and so live 
with pride in themselves and their union and in a status of equality with all other married per-
sons.”). 
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stantive reasons as to why DOMA is unconstitutional as a matter of rights.  
Justice Kennedy emphasizes in his opinion that this polity principle of def-
erence, along with equal protection and substantive due process principles, 
will be central to exploring whether DOMA is valid under the Constitu-
tion.64 
In another look at the application of polity and rights principles to the 
lived lives of persons, Justice Kennedy argues that DOMA is different from 
“these discrete examples [that] establish the constitutionality of limited fed-
eral laws that regulate the meaning of marriage in order to further federal 
policy[.]  DOMA has a far greater reach [than specific laws], [because] it 
enacts a directive applicable to over 1,000 federal statutes and the whole 
realm of federal regulations.”65  The polity principle of deference to state 
decisions on domestic relations and family is violated because of the wide 
effect DOMA has on whether states can honor the values and policies they 
have chosen to recognize with regard to same-sex marriage.  Justice Kenne-
dy emphasizes that this case is not to be decided on the principle of federal-
ism—that is, the idea that DOMA is a violation of the Constitution’s tradi-
tional polity principle of deference to state decisions on marriage—even 
though he could have rested his opinion on this idea and nothing more.  In a 
key passage, Justice Kennedy writes: 
Against this background DOMA rejects the long-established pre-
cept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are 
uniform for all married couples within each State, though they 
may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one State to 
the next.  Despite these considerations, it is unnecessary to decide 
whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the 
Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance.  The State’s 
power in defining the marital relation is of central relevance in 
this case quite apart from principles of federalism.66 
The state’s use of its power to define who can marry “enhanced the 
recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own community”: 
an enhancement directly undermined by DOMA.67  The case, then, turns on 
whether this undermining action is, in fact, a denial of substantive rights 
protected by the Constitution.68  Moreover, given the relationship of polity 
and rights principles, the violation of individual rights by DOMA is even 
more pronounced—that is, the state’s decision, and the national govern-
ment’s failure to recognize that decision, is questioned both in terms of the 
                                                          
 64.  Id. at 2689–90. 
 65.  Id. at 2690. 
 66.  Id. at 2692. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
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substantive values at issue in the decision and the expectation that such de-
cisions are to be made at the state level.  Justice Kennedy is saying that the 
“reach” of DOMA is so wide that it not only violates the power of states to 
define marriage, but also violates rights principles—constitutional, substan-
tive due process and equal protection rights that the Supreme Court defined 
in landmark gay rights cases.  Thus, while Justice Kennedy’s opinion does 
not rest solely on polity principles, violation of such principles adds to the 
violation of rights principles of liberty and equal protection by DOMA, as 
will be explored below. 
B.  Equal Protection of the Law in Windsor After Romer v. Evans 
The Court could have decided Windsor on polity principles—that is, 
on whether or not states traditionally have been the proper venue to decide 
family law in general, and the right to marry in particular.  Instead, the 
Court draws on equal protection principles in Romer v. Evans.69   Justice 
Kennedy writes,  “[D]iscriminations of an unusual character especially sug-
gest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the 
constitutional provision.”70  In Romer, the unusual change in procedure that 
triggered Supreme Court action was a referendum in Colorado that asserted 
that all laws involving the status and privileges of gay men and lesbians, in-
cluding executive orders by governors and mayors, would no longer be de-
cided by normal legislative and executive processes.  Rather, they had to be 
put before the people of Colorado in a referendum as part of an amendment 
process to the state constitution. 
With regard to DOMA, the “discrimination of an unusual character” 
was the decision by Congress to change from the usual practice of defer-
ence to states in defining who can marry; this change imposed restrictions 
and disabilities on a state-defined class and raised constitutional questions.  
Like Colorado’s decision to change the process through which the rights of 
homosexuals are defined as compared to other groups, the Court in Windsor 
is asking whether the change from the usual deference to state definitions of 
marriage is also a denial of equal protection.  Most importantly, the viola-
tion of the polity principle of deference is again linked to rights of liberty as 
defined by the Court in Lawrence and, considered in this light, “is a depri-
vation of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment.”71 
                                                          
 69.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 70.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). 
 71.  Id. 
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C.  Individual Rights Principles and Social Constructions: The Bonds 
of Intimacy in Lawrence Compared to the Bonds of Marriage in 
Windsor 
In a key passage in Windsor, Justice Kennedy links DOMA’s denial of 
federal deference to state decisions on marriage to rights protected in Law-
rence v. Texas.  In Lawrence, the Supreme Court said anti-sodomy laws are 
unconstitutional because, by making sexual intimacy (sodomy) a crime, gay 
men and lesbians, unlike heterosexuals, were not allowed to foster more en-
during personal bonds.72 Justice Kennedy links same-sex marriage to this 
right for gay men and lesbians to have deep and enduring personal bonds, 
writing: 
By its recognition of the validity of same-sex marriages per-
formed in other jurisdictions and then by authorizing same-sex 
unions and same-sex marriages, New York sought to give further 
protection and dignity to that bond. . . .  This status is a far-
reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate relationship be-
tween two people, a relationship deemed by the State worthy of 
dignity in the community equal with all other marriages.73 
Here we see the Court socially constructing what marriage is in light 
of how sexual intimacy was socially constructed—as central to the govern-
ment honoring personal bonds, which become more enduring because of the 
ability to marry.  It is quite clear, then, that the Court here is not resting its 
decision that DOMA is unconstitutional only on equal protection grounds. 
D.  The Relationship of Equal Protection Equality and Due Process 
Liberty 
Justice Kennedy begins Part IV by applying the equal protection prin-
ciples in Romer, asking whether DOMA is based on an improper animus or 
purpose, and thus not permitted.74  For Kennedy, DOMA is unusual be-
cause it violates the polity principle that states decide who can marry, and, 
looking outside the walls of the Constitution to the lived lives of persons, 
this decision by states has a substantial impact on the daily lives and cus-
toms of their citizens.  Kennedy writes: 
                                                          
 72.  Id. at 2692 (“The States’ interest in defining and regulating the marital relation, subject to 
constitutional guarantees, stems from the understanding that marriage is more than a routine clas-
sification for purposes of certain statutory benefits.  Private, consensual sexual intimacy between 
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 73.  Id. at 2692–93. 
 74.  Id. at 2693. 
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 DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recog-
nizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to 
deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that 
come with the federal recognition of their marriages. . . .  The 
avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question 
are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma 
upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the 
unquestioned authority of the States.75 
Justice Kennedy is not simply alluding to the benefits denied to gay 
couples or to the stigma felt by gays from DOMA; he is writing to the prej-
udices against gays by the rest of the population, as he did when he dis-
cussed in Lawrence how state prohibitions on sodomy caused prejudice 
against gays, even if states were prohibiting all citizens from engaging in 
sodomy.76 
In overturning Bowers v. Hardwick,77the Lawrence Court stated that 
reliance on Judeo-Christian values is not a permissible reason for denying 
rights to gays and lesbians.78  In discussing Romer, Kennedy emphasizes 
that the rationale for a law cannot simply be the moral disapproval of some-
thing, as this is pure animus.  Kennedy notes that animus in DOMA is indi-
cated by the reality that the purpose of the law was to influence states not to 
pass same-sex marriage laws, which violated the polity principle of defer-
ence by treating same-sex marriages as “second-class marriages for the pur-
poses of federal law.”79 
Why is this choice by Congress based on animus?  To answer this 
question one must look within the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, which protects our citizens from a denial by the federal government 
of due process and equal protection of the law.80  The Court asks whether 
DOMA denies equal protection of the law; Kennedy answers “yes,” as New 
York sought to eliminate inequality by allowing same-sex marriages, and 
DOMA sought inequality in the application of all federal laws as applied to 
individuals in same-sex marriages.  Moreover, DOMA does so by transcrib-
ing inequality into the entire United States Code, and provides “no identi-
fied connection to any particular area of federal law.”81 
                                                          
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
 77.  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 78.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72. 
 79.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–94. 
 80.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 81.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
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However, federal law treats individuals in very different ways.  Why 
should the different treatment by the federal government of those in same-
sex marriages raise constitutional questions?  Justice Kennedy writes: 
By creating two contradictory marriage regimes within the same 
State, DOMA forces same-sex couples to live as married for the 
purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, 
thus diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal 
relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and pro-
tect.82 
In perhaps the most important sentence in this paragraph, Kennedy 
writes, “Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity and integrity 
of the person.”83  When the federal government takes away the responsibili-
ties and rights of a class of citizens, especially when states choose not to do 
so, then the dignity and integrity of certain persons is undermined.  This is 
substantive rights talk, which gains even more credibility from its linkage to 
the polity principle of deference to states in deciding who may marry.  As 
Justice Kennedy explains, “By this dynamic DOMA . . . tells those couples, 
and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of fed-
eral recognition. This places same-sex couples in an unstable position of be-
ing in a second-tier marriage.”84 
E.  The Dignity That DOMA Denies to Same-Sex Couples Involves a 
Denial of Protected Liberties 
But why is state sanctioning of same-sex marriage and the federal re-
jection of such sanctioning significant constitutionally?  Why is this une-
qual treatment of state-defined same-sex marriages by the federal govern-
ment unconstitutional?  To answer this question, Justice Kennedy looks to 
personal rights as defined in Lawrence.  The failure of the federal govern-
ment to recognize same-sex marriages also undermines the integrity and 
closeness of a family, and thus undermines enduring personal relations.  
Justice Kennedy writes: 
 The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexu-
al choices the Constitution protects and whose relationship the 
State has sought to dignify.  And it humiliates tens of thousands 
of children now being raised by same-sex couples.  The law in 
question makes it even more difficult for the children to under-
stand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its con-
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cord with other families in their community and in their daily 
lives.85 
We can see from the passages above that the Court is not just explor-
ing equal protection rights, but is viewing the right to marry as a right simi-
lar to substantive due process rights of personhood and privacy.  That is, the 
choice of whether to be in a same-sex marriage has both public and private 
components.  When Kennedy writes “whose moral and sexual choices the 
Constitution protects,” he is couching the right to marriage in private rights 
terms—in terms of the choices that homosexuals can make about the nature 
of bonds they want to have with their spouses. 
Justice Kennedy is also saying that the decision by the national gov-
ernment not to honor the right to marry created by states is a denial of fun-
damental rights.  This is important, because the Court is saying that the 
problem with DOMA is not simply about unequal treatment of homosexual 
and heterosexual marriages.  It is about the denial of protected rights of lib-
erty.  It is not just that different classes of citizens are recognized by states 
and the national government; it is that the national government allows two 
classes of citizens with regard to the right to marry—a right that is central 
to values protected by the Constitution.  Moreover, in many cases the Court 
has said that the right to marry is a fundamental right;86 what is new to 
Windsor is the specific link between the right to sexual intimacy to ensure 
enduring personal ties for gays and lesbians, as recognized in Lawrence, 
and the right to marry, which the federal government refuses to recognize. 
F.  The Burdens, Duties, and Responsibilities of Marriage and Equal 
Respect 
Justice Kennedy asks whether DOMA burdens same-sex couples, with 
regard to their married and family life, “in visible and public ways,” noting 
that DOMA “prevents same-sex married couples from obtaining govern-
ment healthcare benefits they would otherwise receive,” “forces them to fol-
low a complicated procedure to file their state and federal taxes jointly,” 
and “prohibits them from being buried together in veterans’ cemeteries.”87  
Moreover, DOMA brings financial harm to children of same-sex couples 
by “ rais[ing] the cost of health care for families by taxing health bene-
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fits provided by employers to their workers’ same-sex spouses” and by 
“den[ying] or reduc[ing] benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a 
spouse and parent, benefits that are an integral part of family security.”88 
DOMA also “divests married same-sex couples of the duties and re-
sponsibilities that are an essential part of married life and that they in most 
cases would be honored to accept were DOMA not in force.”89  These in-
clude the requirement that a married person take into “consideration a 
spouse’s income in calculating a student’s federal financial aid eligibility” 
“because it is expected that spouses will support each other as they pursue 
educational opportunities.”90  Kennedy is emphasizing that meeting respon-
sibilities under federal law leads to equal respect for same-sex couples by 
the wider public and treats them as equal before the law.  Responsibilities, 
not only benefits from government, support enduring ties. 
When Justice Kennedy explores the burdens that DOMA places on 
same-sex couples with regard to their married and family life, he looks out-
side the walls of the Constitution to document the law’s impact on the daily 
lives of same-sex couples, demonstrating why DOMA is a denial of equal 
protection of the law and of liberty to secure enduring personal relations.  
The law violates these principles “in visible and public ways”—an im-
portant phrase because it suggests that DOMA leads to disrespect by the 
wider public for those in same-sex marriages. 
In the concluding paragraphs of the decision, Kennedy restates the 
principles that drive the discussion of the case on its merits.  He again em-
phasizes that DOMA denies due process liberty rights, not simply equal 
protection before the law, and that there is a close relationship between due 
process and equal protection rights.  Justice Kennedy writes: 
What has been explained to this point should more than suffice to 
establish that the principal purpose and the necessary effect of 
this law are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-
sex marriage. . . .  The liberty protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition 
against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.  
While the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government 
the power to degrade or demean in the way this law does, the 
equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes 
                                                          
 88.  Id. at 2695 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1, 26 CFR § 1.106-1 
(2012); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6850011 (Sept. 10, 1998); SSA, Social Security Survivors Benefits 
(2012)). 
 89.  Id. 
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that Fifth Amendment right all the more specific and all the better 
understood and preserved.91 
The above quotation makes very clear that DOMA violates the due 
process component of the Fifth Amendment.  Such liberties that all persons 
have and that have been granted to gays and lesbians in Lawrence clearly 
apply to same-sex couples, given the place of marriage in society—to sup-
port the durability of individual and family relationships.  The role of the 
equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to 
states only adds specificity, understanding, and preservative qualities to the 
nature of the rights of liberty that DOMA denies in not allowing national 
government recognition of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages. 
III.  THE FORCEFULNESS OF DISSENTING ARGUMENTS AGAINST SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE AND THE TEST OF TIME 
A.  Introduction 
An analysis of the dissenting opinions by Justices Scalia and Alito and 
Chief Justice Roberts provides additional evidence that Windsor will stand 
the test of time.  A comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions re-
veals that Justice Kennedy engages in classic Model 2, bidirectional deci-
sionmaking, while the dissenting opinions do not.  In so doing, the dissent-
ing opinions unsuccessfully attempt to maintain a formalist-realist divide, 
which decreases the staying power of their decisions. 
Because Justice Kennedy’s decision can rest on both the polity princi-
ple of deference to states and DOMA’s lack of respect for that principle, as 
well as evidence of rights violations, it is far stronger than Justice Scalia’s 
dissent, as well as those of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.  Justice 
Scalia forcefully demonstrates that the Kennedy decision rests on rights 
principles—and not only on the rights principles in Lawrence, but also on 
equal protection principles as well—and so he must fall back to weaker, 
more general arguments such as trust of political institutions when the Con-
stitution does not specifically grant certain rights.  Either this, or he must 
fall back on his argument that was rejected in Romer, as well as in Law-
rence—that members of political institutions may craft legislation prejudi-
cial to gay men and lesbians simply because they believe homosexuality is 
immoral.92 
It is difficult for Justice Scalia and the other dissenters to make the ar-
gument that DOMA’s lack of recognition of same-sex marriage does not 
                                                          
 91.  Id. (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954); Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995)). 
 92.  Id. at 2707. 
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harm same-sex couples or socially construct what marriage does and is, as it 
is quite clear that, by not recognizing marriage equality, DOMA under-
mines enduring social relations; indeed, a major reason why the national 
government provides so many incentives for people to marry is to establish 
this enduring relation, and denying entrance into this relation for a certain 
group of people constitutes a distinct construction of the right—as well as a 
distinct denial.  The argument that a democratic majority can ban same-sex 
marriages and only permit opposite-sex marriages because it favors tradi-
tional marriage is a difficult one to make and sustain, especially when the 
right to marry is at the core of so many landmark decisions, including Mey-
er v. Nebraska,93 Skinner v. Oklahoma,94 Griswold v. Connecticut,95 
Zablocki v. Redhail,96 and Turner v. Safley,97 to name but a few.  It is diffi-
cult to maintain the argument that DOMA is not based on pure animus, be-
cause no reason other than the opposition to same-sex marriage is given as 
to why DOMA was passed, and this reason has been rejected by the Court 
in prior cases. 
B.  Tiers of Equal Protection Scrutiny 
The mutual construction of the relationship between equality and liber-
ty becomes clearer because Justice Kennedy is not speaking the language of 
“tiers of scrutiny;”98 he is writing about the denial of equal protection of the 
law as explored in Romer—that it is pure animus if no relationship is of-
fered between the ends and means of a law.  However, although not formal-
ly stated, both Romer and Lawrence provide clear indications that sexual 
orientation classifications will be subjected to heightened Court scrutiny; 
the reasons the majority used in Bowers v. Hardwick to allow an anti-
sodomy law to stand—such as history and tradition, Judeo-Christian belief 
systems, and a simple decision by government that sodomy was immoral—
are no longer acceptable reasons to deny liberty and equality to gay men 
and lesbians.99 
In Justice Scalia’s case, arguing for DOMA’s constitutionality on the 
view that sexual orientation classifications are subject only to minimal 
Court scrutiny100—rather than the test of strict scrutiny as with race classifi-
                                                          
 93.  262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 94.  316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 95.  381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
 96.  434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978). 
 97.  482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987).  
 98.  United States v. Winsdsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia J., dissenting). 
 99.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567–72 (2003). 
 100.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706. 
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cations or intermediate scrutiny as with gender classifications—is problem-
atic, especially when it extends to a rejection of the right to marry for same-
sex couples.  This is because there is clear evidence that the Court has sub-
jected sexual orientation classifications to heightened scrutiny without for-
mally mandating such a strict examination.  Justice Scalia notes that 
DOMA meets the minimal scrutiny test, as it allows the government to 
avoid difficult choice-of-laws issues and preserves the intended effects of 
prior legislation against then-unforeseen changes in circumstance.101  How-
ever, many justices on the Court, both liberal and conservative, have reject-
ed a simple, tiered approach to equal protection analysis—and the Court 
acknowledged this rejection in Romer and again in Lawrence.102 
C.  Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Justice Scalia’s Rearguard 
Action to Stop the Right to Same-Sex Marriage 
Justice Scalia recognizes the writing on the wall—that Windsor is 
based on substantive due process rights principles, which, if allowed to 
stand, will lead to a constitutional right to same-sex marriage—even though 
he notes that lower federal courts could distinguish Windsor on polity prin-
ciple grounds.  Justice Scalia’s astonishing example of the easy transporta-
bility of the Windsor decision is clear evidence of his fears as to the force of 
the arguments used by Justice Kennedy.103 
At the end of his opinion, Justice Scalia is forced back into the view 
that political branches should settle this issue.  However, most jurists (as 
well as scholars), disfavor Court decisions being made primarily on 
originalist grounds because this leads to a limitation on social constructions 
that makes the Constitution too separate from the lived lives of our nation’s 
citizens—a limitation that is not lessened or countered by any potential dif-
ficulty of citizens to understand why we leave decisions about their consti-
tutional rights to nine justices of the Supreme Court. 
Justice Roberts also offers his views on why Windsor should not be 
understood as leading to a constitutional right of same-sex marriage.  There 
are strategic elements in the opinion, especially in his muted chastising of 
Justice Scalia for ridiculing the veracity of Justice Kennedy’s disclaimer 
that this case only applies to DOMA and not to a right to same-sex mar-
riage.  Chief Justice Roberts accepts Justice Kennedy’s disclaimer that this 
                                                          
 101.  Id. at 2708. 
 102.  Both Justice O’Connor’s equal protection argument as to why anti-sodomy laws are un-
constitutional, as well as Justice Kennedy’s belief that at the core of equal protection and due pro-
cess liberty are substantive values that are not so distinct when applied to the case of sexual inti-
macy in Lawrence, help to explain the staying power of Lawrence and, by extension, Windsor. 
 103.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709–10. 
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opinion is confined to DOMA’s failure to apply federal laws to lawful mar-
riages that states have already recognized.  Therefore, Roberts views the 
disclaimer as “a logical and necessary consequence of the argument the ma-
jority has chosen to adopt.”104  By this he means that Justice Kennedy’s de-
cision is based on respect for the polity principle that states have the power 
to decide who can marry—and nothing more.  Chief Justice Roberts writes, 
“there is no such departure [from the polity principle] when one State 
adopts or keeps a definition of marriage that differs from that of its 
neighbor, for it is entirely expected that state definitions would ‘vary, sub-
ject to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next.’”105 
He continues, “[t]he State’s power in defining the marital relation is of 
central relevance” to the majority’s decision to strike down DOMA and 
notes that “that power will come into play on the other side of the board in 
future cases about the constitutionality of state marriage definitions.”106 
Thus, Chief Justice Roberts supports his argument that there is no right 
to same-sex marriage under the Constitution by emphasizing that, unlike in 
DOMA where the national government demonstrated its disrespect towards 
same-sex couples through its failure to recognize state-sanctioned same-sex 
marriages, there is no such disrespect when states choose not to allow same-
sex marriages.  This is because states, not the federal government, are the 
traditional venues for the definition of who can marry.  Chief Justice Rob-
erts writes: 
The majority emphasizes that DOMA was a “system-wide enact-
ment with no identified connection to any particular area of fed-
eral law,” but a State’s definition of marriage “is the foundation 
of the State’s broader authority to regulate the subject of domes-
tic relations with respect to the ‘[p]rotection of offspring, proper-
ty interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities.’”107 
Chief Justice Roberts cannot stop at a discussion of the polity princi-
ple, even though that will be at the center of distinguishing Windsor from a 
case involving the right to marry under the Constitution.  Therefore, who 
can marry should be left up to politics and not unelected justices, at least 
until the right to same-sex marriage is more securely embedded in our na-
tion’s history and tradition, even though it is not clear what he believes is 
evidence of being embedded. 
In his argument, Chief Justice Roberts rejects the legitimacy of prece-
dents, such as Romer and Lawrence, because they engage in Model 2 bidi-
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rectional decisionmaking and consider polity and rights principles, the rela-
tionship between them, and social constructions in support of rights princi-
ples in past cases.108 
Windsor is built upon the rights principle of liberty to secure enduring 
personal relationships and on the social construction of marriage as support-
ing such relationships.  DOMA’s refusal to defer to state definitions of mar-
riage is used by Justice Kennedy to further the argument as to why DOMA 
denies liberty and equality to same-sex couples.109  An argument against the 
right to same-sex marriage based on a narrow focus on deference to states, 
or on history and tradition—or even the notion that we should trust politics, 
not courts, when no specific right in the Constitution is violated—does not 
have the same force because it is not linked to the lived lives of persons.  
This is why the rights identified in Windsor led to the right to same-sex 
marriage under the Constitution in Obergefell, as explored below. 
D.  The Relation of Formalism to Realism in Originalist Arguments 
The dissenting arguments are weaker because they separate out foun-
dational, formalist arguments and realism when no such separation is possi-
ble.  We see this clearly in Justice Alito’s dissent.  Justice Alito builds on 
many of the arguments used by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts as 
to why DOMA is constitutional and why Windsor should not be viewed as 
leading to a right to marry.  At the core of Justice Alito’s reasoning is his 
agreement with the other dissenters on how the Constitution should be in-
terpreted, on a history and tradition in support of heterosexual marriage, and 
on the polity principle that the Court should leave individual rights not 
specified by the Constitution to politics.110 
Along with his fellow dissenters, Alito rejects Model 2, bidirectional 
decisionmaking that employs a comparison of polity and rights principles 
(and social constructions) in prior cases as the Court decides the case at 
hand.  At the center of the Alito decision is the view that one can decide 
whether one wants to define marriage as “conjugal-based” or  “consent-
based.”111  Those viewing marriage as “consent-based” support the right to 
same-sex marriage; those viewing marriage as “conjugal-based” support on-
ly heterosexual marriage.112 
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The Court should not constitutionalize one particular view of marriage, 
argues Justice Alito, for the reasons listed above.  Justice Alito emphasizes 
that we do not know the long-term consequences of the recognition of 
same-sex marriages on society, children, or heterosexual marriages.113  
Courts are not as capable as political institutions to recognize difference of 
opinion among the population over marriage rights.  Nor are they particu-
larly capable of considering the empirical evidence as to the impact of 
same-sex marriage on society.114  However, allowing a political majority to 
choose between “conjugal-based” or “consent-based” marriages does not 
respect the equal right of persons to decide what will make their personal 
relations enduring.  Thus, not allowing same-sex marriage is a denial of 
equal protection of the law in an area of protected liberties—and thus vio-
lates constitutionally-protected rights.  The fact that most reputable studies 
show no differences between same-sex or opposite-sex marriages with re-
gard to childrearing or social impact—and given that a right, defined in pri-
or cases, is involved and applied in Windsor—suggested that the right to 
same-sex marriage was on the horizon.115 
Arguments based on an originalist interpretation of the Constitution, 
leaving decisions up to politics when the Constitution is not clear as to 
rights principles, are not as strong as arguments based on Model 2 deci-
sionmaking because, as applied to the right to same-sex marriage, they do 
not delve deeply into the lived lives of persons.  Arguments about the rela-
tionship between rights principles and lived lives are much stronger than 
those based on polity principles alone.  Arguments that show the bidirec-
tional relationship among polity and rights principles are the strongest, es-
pecially when they are built on precedents, as is Windsor. 
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The dissenters want to leave the right to same-sex marriage up to more 
directly accountable political institutions—that is, to the states or to the na-
tional government.  However, the Court had already decided in Lawrence 
that all persons have the right to sexual intimacy as part of their right to en-
during personal relations.116  Since marriage makes personal relations even 
more enduring, it should not be left to the states and the federal government 
to deny same-sex marriage.  The Supreme Court had no choice but to de-
cide that there is a right to same-sex marriage in Obergefell because failure 
to do so would have denied same-sex couples the enjoyment of equal rights.  
Finally, “leaving it up to politics” under a polity principle of deference, or 
disregarding rights of liberty already defined for those in homosexual rela-
tionships, make little sense, because to do so is to disregard the importance 
of the process of analogy relating principles and social constructions at is-
sue in Windsor with those found in prior cases. 
The majority opinion in Windsor is a classic example of Model 2, bidi-
rectional decisionmaking.  The principles and social constructions that pro-
duced a liberty of sexual relations in Lawrence led to the principles and so-
cial constructions behind the Windsor decision, establishing why DOMA’s 
refusal to recognize the right to same-sex marriage established by the states 
constitutes an even greater denial of liberty than that present in Lawrence—
and equally important, laying the groundwork for an actual right to same-
sex marriage. 
Most importantly, throughout the case, the polity principle of defer-
ence to state choices in deciding who can marry is related to denial of equal 
protection rights principles in Romer and due process liberty and equal pro-
tection principles in Lawrence.  While at one level, polity and rights princi-
ples are analytically distinct as ideas, the importance of the polity and rights 
principles that are violated assume a greater forcefulness in the Kennedy 
opinion as the bidirectional impact of the principles and social constructions 
reinforce each other.  Does denial of equal protection and due process rights 
by DOMA indicate disrespect for the polity principle of deference to state 
definitions of marriage?  Yes.  Does DOMA’s lack of respect for state deci-
sions on marriage indicate a similar lack of respect for equal protection and 
due process principles in Romer and Lawrence?  Yes.  This bidirectionality 
between polity and rights principles adds to the potency of Justice Kenne-
dy’s argument and makes it more difficult to overturn—adding to the stay-
ing power of rights defined in Windsor. 
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E. The Windsor Decision Should Not Have Been Unexpected 
One way to understand why the right to same-sex marriage will be 
recognized as a constitutional right is to compare such a right with rights of 
liberty that have or have not been overturned in the past.  West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish117 overturned Adkins v. Children’s Hospital118 and Lochner 
v. New York,119 which established the right to make economic contracts as a 
protected liberty under the Due Process Clause.  Lochner was overturned 
because this liberty, and the social construction on which it was based, no 
longer made sense to the Court and the nation when one analyzed the eco-
nomic and social world outside the Court.  No longer was it assumed that an 
individual employer and employee were in an equal bargaining position to 
decide wages and working conditions, and no longer was it assumed that 
laissez-faire economics was best for the nation, given the costs to workers 
and the wider public of constitutionalizing such a theoretical viewpoint.120 
Similarly, the principles and social constructions in support of the con-
stitutionality of segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson121 were no longer viewed 
as viable in Brown v. Board of Education.122  No longer did the Court be-
lieve the social construction in Plessy—that segregation was only social and 
did not carry an imputation of racial inferiority for African Americans by 
the government, which was prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause.  And no longer did the Court believe that the feel-
ings of inferiority felt by African Americans were personal or individual, 
rather than caused and imposed by state action.123 
In contrast, Roe v. Wade124 was not overturned in Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey125 because both the right to liberty under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment—with regard to personal, not economic, 
matters—was still very much alive and had been expanded upon by the 
Court, and the social constructions regarding the importance of abortion in 
light of failed contraception were even more necessary as more women 
were active in the economic, social, and political sphere in 1992 compared 
to 1973.126 
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Arguments that link polity and rights principles and bring the world 
outside the Court in as part of that linkage through a social construction 
process “that makes sense,” as Justice Kennedy’s Windsor opinion does, are 
even more forceful and believable.  The right to enduring personal bonds is 
a cocoon around personal relations built on a social construction of what the 
family is, and what supports or does not support it.  Thus, the right of liber-
ty for same-sex couples and the social construction of that right in the lived 
lives of these families has far more moral force than polity principles alone.  
The social construction of what a family is and why it needs liberty interests 
will stand the test of time; therefore, it was simply a matter of time before 
the establishment of a right to same-sex marriage under the Constitution—
and not too long a period of time at that. 
IV.  OBERGEFELL V. HODGES (2015) 
A.  The Mutual Construction of Formalism and Realism 
As I predicted after U.S. v. Windsor was decided, the right to same-sex 
marriage under the Constitution was not long in coming.  It came in Ober-
gefell v. Hodges.127  Obergefell confirms and builds upon the Supreme 
Court decisionmaking process I discussed with regard to Windsor, Law-
rence, and prior cases involving the rights of gay men and lesbians to priva-
cy and personhood. The Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded implied 
fundamental rights to liberty and equal protection found in prior cases—and 
did so while the conservative coalition on the Court, and political institu-
tions outside of it, failed to do so.128 
In Obergefell, as in Windsor and other precedents in this doctrinal ar-
ea, the Court engages in a bidirectional decisionmaking process through 
which there is a mutual construction of formalist and realist elements; spe-
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cifically, Obergefell cannot be explained only on the basis of either formal-
ist or realist elements. For example, it cannot be explained by external fac-
tors that are emphasized by political scientists employing the attitudinal and 
regime approach to explain Court decisionmaking and why rights change.  
Similarly, simple application of formalist rights or polity principles falls 
short as well. In Obergefell, as in Windsor and other precedents, we see the 
importance of both polity and rights principles, and the relationship be-
tween them.  Both majority and minority justices write to the importance of 
polity principles, including the deference of the federal government to state 
decisions on marriage and, more generally, the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court in establishing new fundamental rights under the Constitution.129 In 
Obergefell, the Court was faced with the decision of whether the polity 
principle of deference to state determination of marriage is at the core of the 
issue, as minority justices argue, or whether rights of liberty under the Due 
Process Clause and equality under the Equal Protection Clause, as defined 
in Windsor, apply to the constitutionality of state bans on same-sex mar-
riage. 
At the core of the decisionmaking in Obergefell, as in prior cases, is 
the importance of the social construction process, through which rights 
principles gain meaning and specificity.  As in all individual rights cases, 
the Court explores polity and rights principles and social constructions at 
issue in the case before the Court. In Obergefell, the social construction in-
cludes principles and social constructions found in Windsor and other prec-
edents.  However, the majority and minority justices in this case have quite 
different views of whether liberty and equality principles are being violated 
and whether or not the polity principle of deference to state definitions of 
marriage should trump fundamental rights as defined in prior cases.  In 
Obergefell, the minority justices continue to emphasize the polity principle 
of deference to state definitions of marriage, along with polity principles 
about the role of the Supreme Court in establishing fundamental rights un-
der the Constitution.130 
As in Windsor, the minority arguments against establishing the right to 
same-sex marriage are weaker than those of the majority in Obergefell—
and for similar reasons.  The most important of these reasons is the same in 
both cases: showing the effects of the denial of marriage rights to same-sex 
couples by way of a social construction of the rights in terms of the lived 
lives of gay men and lesbians and their children is much more forceful and 
relatable than a social construction of the alleged hurt suffered by hetero-
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sexual individuals and couples who oppose same-sex marriage on religious 
or secular grounds.  Thus, at the core of the decisionmaking process in 
Obergefell, as in prior decisions, is an analogical process through which the 
principles and social constructions among the cases are compared. 
Because the rights principles involving liberty and equality at issue in 
Obergefell are no different than those in Windsor, the majority of justices 
refused to reject them.131  As we see throughout the Obergefell majority 
opinion, state bans on same-sex marriage, like the national government’s 
failure to recognize state-defined, same-sex marriages, involve the same 
unconstitutional refusal to provide dignity, equality, liberty, and personhood 
to same-sex couples and their children as was found in Windsor—
conclusions based on rights principles and social constructions ultimately 
stemming from Lawrence and prior due process and equal protection cases. 
Thus, there is little difference between the rights violations committed at 
the federal level through the passage of DOMA, as explored in Windsor, 
and the rights violations committed at the state level through same-sex mar-
riage bans, as explored in Obergefell. 
In Obergefell, as in Windsor and Lawrence, the Court emphasizes the 
importance of marriage in fostering deep, enduring personal relations de-
serving of protection; the hurt and loss of dignity to children and parents in 
same-sex families caused by the prejudice of the wider society towards 
them; and the rejection of simple, moral disapproval against gays as a basis 
for legislation.132  Thus, as with DOMA, the failure of states to recognize 
same-sex marriages undermines the integrity, stability, and closeness of the 
family, and thus undermines enduring personal and social relations.133 
The importance of the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking process, in 
which there is a mutual construction of rights principles in light of the lived 
lives of persons, is demonstrated by the Obergefell decision—as well as by 
the fact that, based on Windsor, most federal district and circuit courts, and 
many state courts, found state bans on same-sex marriage to be unconstitu-
tional under the Constitution, even though no such right was established by 
Windsor.  This is a testament to the acceptance of the proposition that Court 
decisionmaking is bidirectional—that rights and social constructions, while 
analytically distinct, are mutually constructed to determine whether rights 
exist. 
These decisions by the Supreme Court, lesser federal courts, and state 
courts, with regard to same-sex marriage also speaks to the important ques-
tion of when courts choose to establish, disestablish, or expand implied 
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fundamental rights.  As in Planned Parenthood v. Casey134 compared to 
Roe v. Wade135—but unlike Plessy v. Ferguson compared to Brown v. 
Board of Education136 and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital137 compared to 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish138—when the social, economic, and politi-
cal constructions in support of rights principles endure in their relevancy, 
the right is sustained or expanded upon, not overturned.  The rights princi-
ples and social constructions undergirding the decision in Obergefell over 
whether state bans on same-sex marriage are constitutional are the same 
rights and constructions that supported the finding of federal government 
wrongdoing through DOMA in Windsor.  The relationship between mar-
riage and the enduring personal relations of same-sex couples is fundamen-
tal, regardless of whether it is the federal government or a state failing to 
recognize that relationship. 
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy continues the theme of the relationship 
between marriage and a) its importance to the wider, social world; b) the 
protection of enduring, personal bonds; and c) the stability and dignity of 
same-sex couples and their families.139  Justice Kennedy also continues an-
other theme found in Lawrence—that both liberty and equal protection 
principles in the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable to the question of 
whether there is a right to same-sex marriage; the relationship between lib-
erty and equality is demonstrated through Kennedy’s social construction 
process.140  This reinforcement of liberty and equality principles is the basis 
for Kennedy’s robust argument for the constitutionality of same-sex mar-
riage. Justice Kennedy is arguing that the social construction of marriage 
should not be based on a separate analysis of liberty and equality principles 
because to do so would not allow the Court to see the full impact of state 
marriage bans on the lived lives of same-sex couples and their families.  
The loss of liberty informs a loss of equality, and a loss of equality informs 
a loss of liberty.  Strict segmentation of analysis into due process liberty or 
equal protection equality would not permit the Court to identify the full na-
ture of injustice to same-sex couples and their families that is caused by 
state bans on same-sex marriage.  Therefore, principles of liberty and equal-
ity must be applied synergistically and symbiotically to see why bans on 
same-sex marriage are unconstitutional. 
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At issue here is not simply the right to privacy—the right to be left 
alone—as a liberty interest. The concept of liberty and personhood, going 
as far back as Griswold v. Connecticut,141 is much more filigreed as to per-
son, family, and enduring, personal bonds than simply the right to be left 
alone. This is so because state action to ban the use of contraceptives by 
married persons in Griswold or the non-married in Eisenstadt v. Baird142 
affects not simply the physical intrusion of the home: it also involves the 
psychological encroachment into the minds of persons affected by such 
bans.143 
The Court in Obergefell is refusing to be pigeonholed into looking at 
liberty and equality separately, as if the loss of one does not impact the oth-
er.  It refuses to see doctrinal principles as separate and distinct when they 
inform the same acts by government.  The Court is bidirectional in showing 
that liberty and equality principles reinforce each other when the Court en-
gages in the social construction of what it means for government to ban 
same-sex marriage.  The Court rejects hollow formalism, where liberty and 
equality principles may remain separate, when its real-life application of 
these principles to the lived lives of persons demonstrates that they function 
together.  These mutually reinforcing principles and their application reveal 
even greater injustices to same-sex couples and their families.  The Court 
demonstrates this point through its discussion of “the synergy between the 
two protections” in numerous precedents, with the discussion focusing in 
particular on Loving v. Virginia144 and Lawrence v. Texas.145  In other 
words, the social construction of a denial of same-sex marriage, accom-
plished through the synergistic application of due process liberty and equal 
protection equality principles, is not new to the Court’s jurisprudence. 
With regard to the Court and social change, when principles in two 
lines of doctrine reinforce each other in terms of the lived lives of persons, 
as in Obergefell, there is a greater likelihood that rights will be established 
or expanded.  Therefore, principles inform the social construction process—
and of equal importance, social constructions through time pull on princi-
ples and their meanings, such as what the denial of liberty and the denial of 
equality mean.  These findings raise important questions about what to 
make of legal scholars who argue that a right—in this case, the right to 
same-sex marriage—should be based on equal protection or due process 
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liberty grounds.146  If the Court refuses to be formalist in choosing only one 
set of principles to decide a right to same-sex marriage because of what is 
required by justices engaging in a bidirectional, social construction process, 
then questions need to be raised about scholarship that seeks to make the 
case for or against same-sex marriage on exclusively liberty-based or exclu-
sively equality-based grounds. 
B.  An Important Difference Between Kennedy’s Windsor and 
Obergefell Decisions: The Right to Marry and The Supreme Court 
as a Venue for Social Change 
The major difference between Obergefell and Windsor is Justice Ken-
nedy’s rather thorough analysis in the former of when the Supreme Court 
should establish a fundamental right and be a venue for social change.  A 
response to this analysis is the cornerstone of Chief Justice Robert’s elo-
quent dissenting opinion, as well as those of the other dissenting justices.  
When Justice Kennedy explores the question of what role history and tradi-
tion should play in the Court’s deciding whether there is a constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage, we see how principles, social constructions, and 
time relate to each other.147 
Indeed, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has 
recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal un-
justified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once 
passed unnoticed and unchallenged.  To take but one period, this oc-
curred with respect to marriage in the 1970s and 1980s.  Responding to a 
new awareness, the Court invoked equal protection principles to invalidate 
laws imposing sex-based inequality on marriage.148 
In his opinion, Justice Kennedy applies the historical and analytical 
frameworks of past Court jurisprudence to the case at hand: 
[A] long history of disapproval of [same-sex] relationships, this 
denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave 
and continuing harm.  The imposition of this disability on gays 
and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them.  And the 
Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohib-
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its this unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to mar-
ry.149 
Therefore, principles of liberty and equality with regard to a right to 
same-sex marriage change over time and inform each other—as they did 
within issues of heterosexual marriage in the past.  A long-term tradition of 
inequality is not a reason to continue the tradition.  Justice Kennedy is argu-
ing that rights should not be defined as they were in the past. Fundamental 
rights are not fixed if change is to come to society.  Nor should they be de-
fined solely by those who exercised them in the past.  The Court, in other 
words, has a key role in deciding whether new rights are warranted. 
Most importantly, Justice Kennedy emphasizes that the Supreme Court 
should not wait for democracy to act when fundamental rights principles 
already known to courts will be abridged in doing so.  When rights princi-
ples have been established, as they were in Lawrence and Windsor, and the 
conditions of the social constructions underpinning them continue to ex-
ist—or are even greater than in the past—the Supreme Court has a duty to 
act: to define or expand implied fundamental rights.  It is the role of the Su-
preme Court, engaging in a bidirectional legal process, to determine implied 
fundamental rights, not political institutions directly accountable to the 
electorate.  Kennedy writes: 
The dynamic of our constitutional system is that individuals 
need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental 
right. The Nation’s courts are open to injured individuals who 
come to them to vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our 
basic charter. An individual can invoke a right to constitutional 
protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader pub-
lic disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act.150 
Moreover, the Court is saying that the decision over a constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage is not contingent on some crystallization of mo-
mentum for or against same-sex marriage.  This is because the legal process 
has a different set of considerations than those of political institutions.  So-
cial change on the Supreme Court is decided as the result of a bounded, but 
bidirectional, legal process in which the rights and polity principles and so-
cial constructions in a given case take form through a process of analogy 
with precedents—not through mindless subservience to the purported polit-
ical moods of the nation.  Emerging fundamental rights develop through a 
process that is, importantly, legal and bidirectional. Legal norms and pro-
cess are important, in themselves, and because of their interaction with the 
real world outside the Court. 
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Justice Kennedy emphasizes that he does not want minimalism by the 
Court in Obergefell to lead to a similar situation as that found in the time 
period between Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) and Lawrence v. Texas (2003), 
where there was an unfounded denial of protected liberty interests.151 Ken-
nedy argues convincingly that the situation of the post-Bowers period is 
similar to that faced by scores of same-sex couples in the country at the 
time of Obergefell.  One can see this when Kennedy lists the rights that are 
denied to the petitioners in the case.152  To require a minimalist, case-by-
case determination of the constitutionality of specific benefits that the states 
deny same-sex couples would fail to recognize how they are intertwined 
with rights and responsibilities that are central to what constitutes mar-
riage—and why the Court, over many years, has viewed marriage as central 
to the liberty of persons and equal protection of the law. 
Finally, the Court asks whether outlawing bans on same-sex marriage 
will damage heterosexual marriage; they find the argument is “counterintui-
tive” given the reasons for why heterosexual couples choose to marry.  
Kennedy writes that, “[d]ecisions about whether to marry and raise chil-
dren are based on many personal, romantic, and practical considerations; 
and it is unrealistic to conclude that an opposite-sex couple would choose 
not to marry simply because same-sex couples may do so.”153 
The question as to whether and when the Court should establish 
individual rights or leave it up to political branches dominates Chief 
Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion.  Chief Justice Roberts argues that 
the Court should not decide whether same-sex marriage is constitutional; in 
doing so, he argues same-sex marriage is not rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people.154  Moreover, for the Court to decide the constitu-
tionality of same-sex marriage would be to do what the Court did in Loch-
ner—decide and define public policy rather than leaving it to political insti-
tutions.155  Chief Justice Roberts writes, “Rejecting Lochner does not 
require disavowing the doctrine of implied fundamental rights, and this 
Court has not done so.  But to avoid repeating Lochner’s error of convert-
ing personal preferences into constitutional mandates, our modern sub-
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stantive due process cases have stressed the need for ‘judicial self-
restraint.’”156 
Key for Justice Roberts is the distinctions between Obergefell and the 
cases that precede it. One distinction he makes is on the concept of “mar-
riage,” arguing that the precedents on which the majority justices build the 
case for a right to same-sex marriage were decided on the significantly dif-
ferent and distinct premise that a marriage is between a man and a woman.  
Alternatively, Roberts tries to distinguish Obergefell from Griswold and 
Lawrence by saying the right to same-sex marriage does not involve an in-
trusion into the privacy of the home under a criminal statute.157 
At the core of this viewpoint, and Chief Justice Robert’s’ entire 
dissenting opinion, is a very different view of the principle of liberty 
and social constructions of privacy. Chief Justice Roberts sees privacy 
as related to government intrusion in the home, rejecting the notion that 
the Court has treated liberty in personal relations differently from liber-
ty in, for example, economic relations. He sees the Court as arbitrarily 
deciding what benefits same-sex couples should receive, rather than in-
volving rights of privacy and personhood: 
[T]he privacy cases provide no support for the majority’s posi-
tion, because petitioners do not seek privacy. Quite the opposite, 
they seek public recognition of their relationships, along with 
corresponding government benefits. Our cases have consistently 
refused to allow litigants to convert the shield provided by con-
stitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive entitlements 
from the State.158 
Chief Justice Roberts rejects Justice Kennedy’s language relating 
liberty principles to the social constructions in Lawrence and Windsor 
concerning the implications of failing to recognize same-sex marriages 
for enduring, personal bonds and the harm suffered by same-sex parents 
and their children; he does this because of his philosophy of judicial re-
view, because of what level of scrutiny he believes the Court should 
deploy when exploring the question of the constitutionality of same-sex 
marriage bans.  This is due to an acceptance of the polity principle of 
judicial self-restraint—regardless of whether implied fundamental 
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rights issues are involved—and a far narrower reading of what liberty 
and personhood mean based on precedents.  The Court, as a venue for 
social change, should be minimalist.  New insights by justices as to 
what constitutes injustice should not inform Court decisionmaking.  
Chief Justice Roberts writes: 
The truth is that today’s decision rests on nothing more than the 
majority’s own conviction that same-sex couples should be al-
lowed to marry because they want to, and that “it would dispar-
age their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them 
this right.” Whatever force that belief may have as a matter of 
moral philosophy, it has no more basis in the Constitution than 
did the naked policy preferences.159 
In contrast to the view by Justice Kennedy—that, when implied fun-
damental rights are denied to persons, the Court has a responsibility to vin-
dicate those rights and not acquiesce to political branches, lest harm being 
done to those individuals should continue—Chief Justice Roberts asserts 
that the Court should not engage in a social construction process that ex-
plores such harms: 
Then and now, this assertion of the “harm principle” sounds 
more in philosophy than law.  The elevation of the fullest indi-
vidual self-realization over the constraints that society has ex-
pressed in law may or may not be attractive moral philosophy.  
But a Justice’s commission does not confer any special moral, 
philosophical, or social insight sufficient to justify imposing 
those perceptions on fellow citizens under the pretense of “due 
process.” There is indeed a process due the people on issues of 
this sort—the democratic process.160 
At the core of whether rights are established, disestablished, or 
changed, however, is not simply what principles mean, but most important-
ly, the social construction process on which rights are built. Even when 
Chief Justice Roberts says the main issue in Obergefell is the proper role of 
the Court in a democracy, that question cannot be answered without engag-
ing in a social construction process—a process in which he and his fellow 
minority justices engage in their dissents, despite any explicit disavowals of 
such decisionmaking.  Therefore, engaging in the social construction pro-
cess is an important part of the decisionmaking of all justices, and under-
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standing this, among other things, is key to understanding why rights 
change. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in the area of gay rights and marriage 
equality—from Romer through to Obergefell—reveal the robust process 
that lies at the heart of so many of the Court’s most significant decisions. 
The Court engages in a bidirectional, mutual construction process, examin-
ing the facts in the case at hand, bringing them into dialogue with past prin-
ciples in precedents, and looking beyond the walls of the courthouse into 
the reality of citizens’ lives in order to understand the issues at work. 
Through this reasoned, analogical process, the Court is at once bounded by 
the law and unshackled by rigid theories or doctrines. The process of bring-
ing law into communication with reality, allowing a mutually informative 
dialogue to occur, strengthens the staying power of a decision and grounds 
it with a legal faithfulness and social relevance of precedential value.  The 
Court’s gay rights jurisprudence is a sterling example of such decisionmak-
ing, and the process grounding these decisions is the reason they will stand 
the test of time and continue to positively impact the lives of American citi-
zens. 
 
